HEROES FROM STRANGE QUARTERS—my unknown Kumba friend (the Tabenyang/Ndoki Mukete drama)

In the aftermath of the 1992 presidential election, which supporters of the opposition "Union for Change" coalition believed had been won by their candidate John Fru Ndi of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), the political establishment declared incumbent President Paul Biya the victor. The widespread protests that followed were met with a severe crackdown. Fru Ndi was placed under house arrest, while numerous opposition leaders, particularly from the SDF, were arrested in a sweeping campaign aimed at neutralizing the movement with goals by its different factions to bring an end to the Biya-regime, dismantle the French-imposed system, bring democracy to Cameroon, and/or found "THE NEW CAMEROON"  (achieving the objectives of the pre-independence struggle for reunification and independence led by the historic UPC, its offshots, and sister political parties).

 

Several key figures, however, managed to evade capture, among them Dr. Samuel F. Tchwenko. Widely regarded as the SDF's foremost ideologue at the time, Tchwenko was instrumental in shaping the party's strategic direction and financial networks. He was also largely responsible for persuading influential opposition elites in the West and Littoral Provinces to align with the SDF and mobilize their constituencies behind the party. As the SDF's Southwest Provincial Chairman, he spearheaded the party's implantation in the Southwest Province and accomplished the formidable task of reconciling longstanding political divisions between Northwestern and Southwestern elites. Equally significant, he helped convince many Southwesterners that Fru Ndi represented a new political alternative, distinct from earlier generations of Northwestern leaders whom many believed had marginalized the Southwest during the era of the former West Cameroon federation.

 

With the opposition under intense pressure and many of its leaders either imprisoned or in hiding, the Biya-regime and its French overlords began exploring tentative avenues for dialogue. They viewed Limbe (the former Victoria) as the ideological nerve center of the SDF and a potential safety valve for navigating an increasingly unstable political landscape. This perception was not unfounded. The Victoria SDF had orchestrated the defection of prominent figures from the ruling CPDM to the SDF, including the famous female parliamentarian Victoria Ndando and CPDM Youth Wing President Ebai Namme. It had also attracted influential political broker Evaristus Foupoussi of Bandjoun, who was a functionary in Limbe at the time, into the party. Moreover, Victoria accomplished the colossal task of spearheading the establishment of the SDF throughout the Southwest Province, countering the regime's portrayal of the party as merely a "Graffi" movement with a narrow regional base. Equally important, it played a central role in creating political bridges that enabled civic-nationalist-minded Cameroonians east of the Mungo River or Francophone Cameroon (mostly former UPCists associated with the country’s liberation and their descendants) to join and identify with the SDF, thus transforming the SDF into the force that  would accomplish Cameroons Unfinished Liberation..

 

 

It was in this context of finding a chink in the armor of the SDF and the Union for Change that  John Chemfor was used as an intermediary to establish contact with Dr. Tchwenko, who remained on the run. Given Tchwenko's stature as arguably the second most influential SDF figure in the country at the time and the principal architect of many of its organizational and political successes, securing communication with him was seen as essential to any meaningful engagement between the government and the opposition. Fru Ndi, whose trust in Tchwenko was unwavering, encouraged him to proceed and represent the party in any discussions. This was despite the fact that government agents had burned down Tchwenko's clinic the previous year.

 

Tchwenko subsequently led an SDF delegation comprising Charles Nkwanyuo, Evaristus Foupoussi, and Louis Shalo to meet a CPDM delegation headed by former Prime Minister Sadou Hayatou and the regime's influential businessman and negotiator, Omgba Damase.

 

The regime's proposal was straightforward. Dr. Tchwenko was offered the position of Prime Minister in a coalition government with the CPDM. He would be empowered to select most of his ministers, with the exception of certain key ministries. Paul Biya would remain president and, as it was explicitly stated, would "not be touched."

 

Hayatou and Omgba Damase also promised compensation for Tchwenko's clinic, which ruling-party militants had destroyed in 1991. They reportedly apologized for the incident, claiming that those responsible had acted contrary to instructions.

 

However, when Tchwenko presented the SDF's own proposals, which envisioned a transition that would remove the CPDM and Paul Biya from their dominant positions of authority, Hayatou responded that he had no mandate to negotiate beyond the package he had been instructed to deliver. He promised to report back to his superiors and get in touch again. The talks ended there.

 

Upon his return, Tchwenko submitted his report to the party. His conclusion was unequivocal. He warned that the SDF's cause was fundamentally incompatible with the nature of the regime. In his assessment, the inner workings of the system were so deeply entrenched and so hostile to the aspirations of ordinary people that any attempt at conciliation would ultimately prove self-destructive.

 

Not everyone within the SDF agreed. There were many members, particularly among the party's less revolutionary wing, who viewed Tchwenko's rejection of a unity government as a squandered opportunity. For them, participation in government offered possibilities that could be exploited through political maneuvering. Some harbored ambitions that extended beyond the SDF's broader vision of transformative change. The prospect of ministerial appointments and other prestigious state positions was, for them, more attractive than the far-reaching reforms and "New Cameroon" that had inspired millions of supporters.

 

This marked the beginning of a destructive internal struggle that would plague the SDF for years. Increasingly, the party's leaders expended more energy fighting one another than confronting the regime. Over time, the movement drifted away from its revolutionary mission, ultimately descending into the weakened and fractured state in which many observers find it today.

 

By 1993-1994, a faction openly sympathetic to the idea of entering a coalition government with the CPDM had become increasingly visible within the party. Its leading figures included Secretary-General Siga Asanga and Centre Provincial Chairman Kamdoum. In the Southwest Province, the faction was spearheaded by Ndoki Mukete, who had become provincial chairman.

 

When evidence of the group's activities came to light, the SDF leadership moved decisively. Following deliberations by the National Executive Committee's disciplinary structures, Siga Asanga, Kamdoum, and others were removed from their positions. The NEC also resolved to reorganize several party structures that had been heavily infiltrated by the pro-unity-government faction, including the Southwest Provincial Executive headed by Ndoki Mukete.

 

Ndoki Mukete, however, proved highly effective in shaping the narrative. In areas such as Kupe-Muanenguba, Ndian, and Meme, he convinced many supporters that those opposing him, notably Tabenyang and the anti-unity-government faction based in Limbe, were in fact the ones seeking accommodation with the Biya regime. His campaign was remarkably successful and maintained momentum until the final hours before the vote. Only a last-minute sensitization effort managed to convince many delegates of what was actually at stake. In the end, Ndoki Mukete and his allies were defeated by a slate headed by Tabenyang.

 

Within Ndoki's camp, Limbe was widely blamed for the outcome. Many of his supporters believed that I had played a significant role in his defeat. Their anger culminated in a physical assault against me, led by a towering man from Kumba, standing roughly two meters tall and possessing an intimidating physique with muscles seemingly bulging from every part of his body. Fortunately, many people rushed to my defense, and I escaped unharmed. Nevertheless, the remarks and accusations hurled at me that day were illuminating, revealing far more about the internal dynamics of the struggle than I had previously understood.

 

A few months later, I found myself in Kumba, walking along a street when I heard a voice repeatedly calling out:

 

"Grand! Grand! Grand!"

 

At first, I ignored it. Eventually, I turned around and discovered that the voice belonged to none other than the same two-meter giant who had led the assault against me. He was rising from the veranda of what appeared to be his home.

 

I stopped and braced myself for the worst.

 

Instead, the man approached me with a broad smile. Extending his hand, he greeted me warmly.

 

I was surprised by the gesture, but what followed surprised me even more.

 

"Grand, I am sorry about what happened last December," he said. "We didn't know the truth then. But you were right. Ndoki let us down. They bought him. He is with Biya, them...He chop soya”

 

I was touched by this gentleman's serenity—a fellow whose name I can no longer recall—and by his deep humility in acknowledging human error. Two years later, when Tabenyang betrayed us just as Ndoki had, or perhaps even worse, by defecting to the CPDM under the pretext that decisions by the SDF's National Executive Committee and the chairman had robbed him of his right to become the SDF parliamentary representative for Manyu Division, I found myself wishing to this day that I had another opportunity to meet that gentleman from Kumba. I would say to him with utmost sincerity, "Grand, grand, I was wrong too. My man Tabenyang was no different from your man Ndoki. He too chop soya."

 

That is a debt I owe my Bafou friend. If most of us Cameroonians can admit that we owe one another that same debt—because we, or someone we held in high regard, betrayed our collective trust—then we can truly say we are on the same side: the camp of genuine advocates for change. Right now, many of us or our closest allies have at some point sided with the enemies of the people. Owning up to these shortcomings will make the path forward much easier as we launch the fourth phase of the Cameroonian struggle to dismantle the anachronistic, French-imposed system and build a "New Cameroon" in its place.

 

 

 Janvier Tchouteu-Chando                                                                February 07, 2012

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