In a nutshell, the system offered Dr. Samuel F. Tchwenko the post of prime minister in a union government with the CPDM, where he would choose his ministers except for certain ministries. Biya would stay as president and "not be touched". And Sadou Hayatou and Omgba Damase pledged to compensate him—Tchwenko for his clinic that the ruling party's thugs burnt down in 1991, apologizing about their agents not following instructions. Sadou Hayatou said those proposals were the package deal he had been told to present and that he had no powers to negotiate on SDF’s demands presented by Tchwenko that spelt a way forward without Paul Biya and the CPDM being the primary authority. Hayatou said he would get back with his boss; and that was how the talks ended.
I was taken aback all right by his gesture, but it was his words that moved me most.
In the aftermath of
the disputed 1992 presidential election, which many opposition supporters
believed had been won by John Fru Ndi of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), the
regime instead declared incumbent President Paul Biya the victor. What followed
was a harsh crackdown on the opposition. Fru Ndi was placed under house arrest,
while leading opposition officials were rounded up and detained. A few managed
to evade arrest, among them Dr. Samuel F. Tchwenko.
At the time, Dr.
Tchwenko was widely regarded as one of the SDF's most influential figures. He
was considered the party's chief ideologue, a key architect of its financial
networks, and the person most responsible for persuading political elites in
the West and Littoral Provinces to rally behind the SDF and mobilize their
populations in its favor. As Southwest Provincial Chairman, he had successfully
implanted the party in the province and achieved what many considered an almost
impossible feat: reconciling Northwestern and Southwestern political elites in
the Southwest. He also played a decisive role in convincing many
Southwesterners that Fru Ndi represented a break from the political traditions
of earlier Northwest elites who had marginalized them during the era of the
former West Cameroon federation.
While Tchwenko
remained in hiding, the regime made tentative moves toward dialogue. It used
Chemfor as an intermediary to establish contact with him. Fru Ndi, whose trust
in Tchwenko was unwavering, encouraged him to proceed and represent the party
in any discussions. This was despite the fact that government agents had burned
down Tchwenko's clinic the previous year.
Tchwenko subsequently
led an SDF delegation comprising Charles Nkwanyuo, Evaristus Foupoussi, and
Louis Shalo to meet a CPDM delegation headed by former Prime Minister Sadou
Hayatou and the regime's influential businessman and negotiator, Omgba Damase.
The regime's proposal
was straightforward. Dr. Tchwenko was offered the position of Prime Minister in
a coalition government with the CPDM. He would be empowered to select most of
his ministers, with the exception of certain key ministries. Paul Biya would
remain president and, as it was explicitly stated, would "not be
touched."
Hayatou and Omgba
Damase also promised compensation for Tchwenko's clinic, which ruling-party
militants had destroyed in 1991. They reportedly apologized for the incident,
claiming that those responsible had acted contrary to instructions.
However, when Tchwenko
presented the SDF's own proposals, which envisioned a transition that would
remove the CPDM and Paul Biya from their dominant positions of authority,
Hayatou responded that he had no mandate to negotiate beyond the package he had
been instructed to deliver. He promised to report back to his superiors and get
in touch again. The talks ended there.
Upon his return,
Tchwenko submitted his report to the party. His conclusion was unequivocal. He
warned that the SDF's cause was fundamentally incompatible with the nature of
the regime. In his assessment, the inner workings of the system were so deeply
entrenched and so hostile to the aspirations of ordinary people that any
attempt at conciliation would ultimately prove self-destructive.
Not everyone within
the SDF agreed. There were many members, particularly among the party's less
revolutionary wing, who viewed Tchwenko's rejection of a unity government as a
squandered opportunity. For them, participation in government offered possibilities
that could be exploited through political maneuvering. Some harbored ambitions
that extended beyond the SDF's broader vision of transformative change. The
prospect of ministerial appointments and other prestigious state positions was,
for them, more attractive than the far-reaching reforms and "New
Cameroon" that had inspired millions of supporters.
This marked the
beginning of a destructive internal struggle that would plague the SDF for
years. Increasingly, the party's leaders expended more energy fighting one
another than confronting the regime. Over time, the movement drifted away from
its revolutionary mission, ultimately descending into the weakened and
fractured state in which many observers find it today.
By 1993-1994, a
faction openly sympathetic to the idea of entering a coalition government with
the CPDM had become increasingly visible within the party. Its leading figures
included Secretary-General Siga Asanga and Centre Provincial Chairman Kamdoum.
In the Southwest Province, the faction was spearheaded by Ndoki Mukete, who had
become provincial chairman.
When evidence of the
group's activities came to light, the SDF leadership moved decisively.
Following deliberations by the National Executive Committee's disciplinary
structures, Siga Asanga, Kamdoum, and others were removed from their positions.
The NEC also resolved to reorganize several party structures that had been
heavily infiltrated by the pro-unity-government faction, including the
Southwest Provincial Executive headed by Ndoki Mukete.
Ndoki Mukete, however,
proved highly effective in shaping the narrative. In areas such as
Kupe-Muanenguba, Ndian, and Meme, he convinced many supporters that those
opposing him, notably Tabenyang and the anti-unity-government faction based in
Limbe, were in fact the ones seeking accommodation with the Biya regime. His
campaign was remarkably successful and maintained momentum until the final
hours before the vote. Only a last-minute sensitization effort managed to
convince many delegates of what was actually at stake. In the end, Ndoki Mukete
and his allies were defeated by a slate headed by Tabenyang.
Within Ndoki's camp,
Limbe was widely blamed for the outcome. Many of his supporters believed that I
had played a significant role in his defeat. Their anger culminated in a
physical assault against me, led by a towering man from Kumba, standing roughly
two meters tall and possessing an intimidating physique with muscles seemingly
bulging from every part of his body. Fortunately, many people rushed to my
defense, and I escaped unharmed. Nevertheless, the remarks and accusations
hurled at me that day were illuminating, revealing far more about the internal
dynamics of the struggle than I had previously understood.
A few months later, I
found myself in Kumba, walking along a street when I heard a voice repeatedly
calling out:
"Grand! Grand!
Grand!"
At first, I ignored
it. Eventually, I turned around and discovered that the voice belonged to none
other than the same two-meter giant who had led the assault against me. He was
rising from the veranda of what appeared to be his home.
I stopped and braced
myself for the worst.
Instead, the man
approached me with a broad smile. Extending his hand, he greeted me warmly.
I was surprised by the
gesture, but what followed surprised me even more.
"Grand, I am
sorry about what happened last December," he said. "We didn't know
the truth then. But you were right. Ndoki let us down. They bought him. He is with Biya, them...He chop soya”
I was touched by this
gentleman's serenity—a fellow whose name I can no longer recall—and by his deep
humility in acknowledging human error. Two years later, when Tabenyang betrayed
us just as Ndoki had, or perhaps even worse, by defecting to the CPDM under the
pretext that decisions by the SDF's National Executive Committee and the
chairman had robbed him of his right to become the SDF parliamentary
representative for Manyu Division, I found myself wishing to this day that I
had another opportunity to meet that gentleman from Kumba. I would say to him
with utmost sincerity, "Grand, grand, I was wrong too. My man Tabenyang
was no different from your man Ndoki. He too chop soya."
That is a debt I owe
my Bafou friend. If most of us Cameroonians can admit that we owe one another
that same debt—because we, or someone we held in high regard, betrayed our
collective trust—then we can truly say we are on the same side: the camp of
genuine advocates for change. Right now, many of us or our closest allies have
at some point sided with the enemies of the people. Owning up to these
shortcomings will make the path forward much easier as we launch the fourth
phase of the Cameroonian struggle to dismantle the anachronistic,
French-imposed system and build a "New Cameroon" in its place.
