Thursday, December 20, 2018

Euphoria for a "Revolution" and Truth

Speaking the truth to those who most need to hear it often elicits the wrong response. Revolution is a science. Those who seek to carry it out must think it through carefully, taking into account countless factors. No Western institution has ever developed a sound grasp of it. The fine art of revolution was neither cultivated nor mastered in the West.

In 1997, when the Social Democratic Front (SDF) enjoyed the support of more than 60% of Cameroonians and was nevertheless treated with contempt by the Biya regime and its French backers, some within our ranks believed the party should take up arms. I had just returned home at the time and witnessed these debates firsthand. Yet despite its popularity, the SDF lacked a national idea, a unifying ideology that could serve as a common point of identification for its militants, supporters, sympathizers, and leaders alike.

Those advocating revolution should never dismiss the danger of unintended consequences, particularly when a revolutionary project is poorly conceived or prematurely launched. At the time, the SDF meant different things to different people. It was, in various senses of the expression, a "na wya party" — tribal, linguistic, ethnic, regional, and even national. Such ambiguity constituted a recipe for disaster. Had the party engaged in armed struggle against the system, it could have opened a veritable Pandora's box, unleashing forces far beyond anyone's control.

In short, a revolution requires more than a set of goals. Cameroon, whether considered as a whole or in part, needed a unifying idea or ideal during the democratic and revolutionary phase aimed at dismantling the existing system. This conviction inspired the article below, Terror: Political Weapon, Social Infection, Dehumaniser, which was intended as both a cautionary reflection and a warning.

Before the outbreak of the Anglophone insurgency, the task of developing such a unifying idea was nearing completion. Today, however, reversing the descent into political lethargy brought about by the fragmentation, breakdown of societal norms, lawlessness, and hooliganism West of the River Mungo  due to the amateurism of the Ambazonia insurgency, would require the Herculean engagement of either a revolutionary genius or a madman. This deterioration has benefited the French-imposed system, which was itself nearing political exhaustion. Indeed, the moribund Biya regime has been feeding on the growing anarchy and deriving renewed life from the degeneration taking place in the regions west of the River Mungo, namely the Northwest and Southwest.

Any national or civic-nationalist effort to dismantle the system would face enormous challenges without the meaningful participation of the peoples and territories of the Northwest and Southwest. Such participation can only be secured if Kamerunists (union-nationalists) and federalists, who constitute the majority west of the Mungo, assert themselves and extend a hand to other forces of change in the territories and across Cameroon.



March 2019

I left the SDF in 2002 when John Fru Ndi led the party into what I regarded as a betrayal of the Cameroonian struggle to complete its unfinished liberation. He did so by openly collaborating with the Biya regime and the French-imposed system through the Fru Ndi-Ngwasiri pact. Under this arrangement, the SDF accepted control of local councils and 23 parliamentary seats (13% of the National Assembly), which the regime allowed it to retain despite being the country's most popular political party.

These seats were concentrated largely in the Northwest Province. In doing so, Fru Ndi helped the regime advance its strategy of portraying the SDF as a regional, rather than national, movement. This capitulation by the Fru Ndi faction within the party effectively destroyed the SDF as a national political force and as the perceived successor to the historic UPC. Many civic nationalists, having responded to the calls of Albert Mukong and Dr. Samuel F. Tchwenko, joined the SDF following its launch on May 26, 1990, believing it would become the vehicle through which Cameroon could continue its unfinished struggle for liberation. That promise was ultimately abandoned.

 





Janvier Tchouteu is the author of " The Mistakes To Be Avoided in Building The New Cameroon"

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